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Abstract
In this paper we build a theoretical model to show the role of self-condence in
leading to inecient job matching equilibria: undercondent highly-qualied work-
ers do not apply for highly-skilled jobs, because mistakenly perceive themselves as
having relatively lower abilities with respect to other candidates, and rms are no
longer selecting their workers from a pool containing the best tted ones. Policies
to foster undercondent workers to apply for highly-skilled jobs cannot easily be
implemented, because under-condence is not an observable characteristic, and any
attempt to elicit this information from workers can be easily manipulated. However,
if gender is correlated with this psychological bias, and there more undercondent
female workers than male workers, a second best policy based on gender armative
action may enhance the eciency of matching in the job market. We show that
increasing the gender diversity of the qualied applicants by imposing an arma-
tive action may positively aect the selection of candidates because it increases the
average quality of the pool of candidates for high-qualied jobs.
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What a man thinks of himself, that is which determines, or rather indicates, his fate.
- Henry David Thoreau -
1 Introduction
There is strong evidence that women, while globally facing higher unemployment rates
than men, seem also to be segregated in some segments of the labor market: they
are underrepresented in managerial and legislative occupations and over-represented in
mid-skill occupations1 (Bourmpoula et al., 2012). In this paper, we provide a theoretical
foundation to explain the emergence of gender gap and segregation in the job market,
as a consequence of dierent levels of self-condence of men and women, when abilities
are equally distributed among them. We then show that well-calibrated gender quotas
can be benecial for the employers themselves because they improve the average quality
of their workers.
Dierent reasons have been proposed to explain the existence of the gender gap in
the workplace. First, women may have innate lower (higher) abilities than men in some
sectors and are thus less (more) likely to be selected when applying. However, even if
discussion about this topic is still open, recent research suggests that men and women
do not dier much in their cognitive abilities and it is rather social and cultural factors
that inuence perceived or actual performance dierences (Hyde, 2005, Spelke, 2005).
Second, women and men face a dierent trade-o when formulating their career and
family plans, and a link between relative wages and fertility has been showed (Erosa
et al., 2002, Galor and Weil, 1996). In particular, Dessy and Djebbary (2010) show
that the shorter reproductive capability of women with respect to men causes them
to be more constrained in their career-family choices, so that failure in coordination of
women's marriage-timing decisions lead to persisting gender dierences in career choices.
Third, some studies have suggested the existence of a glass ceiling (Cotter et al.,
2001)2, which leads organization to discriminate women's promotion and thus prevent
1The global female labour force was estimated to be 1.3 billion in 2012, { about 39.9 per cent of the
total labour force of 3.3 billion.
2Carol Hymowitz and Timothy D. Schellhardt were the rst to use the term \glass ceiling" in their
March 24, 1986 article in the Wall Street Journal, \The Glass Ceiling: Why Women Can't Seem to
Break the Invisible Barrier That Blocks Them from the Top Job."
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them to achieve the highest rank in the rm, when having equal abilities than men
(Bassanini and Saint-Martin, 2008). However, a recent research by the Institute Institute
of Leadership & Management (2011), claims that women managers are rather impeded
in their careers by lower ambitions and expectations, which lead them to a cautious
approach to career opportunities, than by a glass ceiling.
A fourth possible explanation of gender segregation has thus been developed, which
relies on dierent preferences of men and women regarding the job environments where
they would like to work, ultimately aecting their job entry decisions. Laboratory
(Gneezy et al., 2003, Masclet et al., 2015) and natural eld experiments (Flory et al.,
2015) provide evidence of women being less likely to apply to competitive work-settings
(for a review of these studies, see Niederle and Vesterlund (2011)). In particular, this
phenomenon is associated with women i) having dierent distributional preferences (Bal-
afoutas et al., 2012), ii) being more risk averse (Charness and Gneezy, 2012) and iii)
less (over)condent than men about their relative performance in a (mathematical) task
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) 3.
Self-condence in the ability to successfully win a contest and the gender of the
competitors seems to play an important role in these studies. Wieland and Sarin (2012)
and Kamas and Preston (2012a) indeed show that there is no dierence in the choice of
the payment scheme (i.e. the decision to compete in tournment) with respect to gender
when considering gender neutral tasks. In particular, Kamas and Preston (2012a), in
a recent experiment investigate the extent to which dierences in a taste to compete
or dierences in ability, condence, risk aversion, or personality characteristics explain
gender dierences in willingness to compete and conclude that gender dierences in
condence, and to a lesser extent risk attitudes, explain this pattern. Moreover, Gunther
et al. (2010) observe that "women tend not to compete with men in areas where they
(rightly or wrongly) think that they will lose anywayay". Whether women have lower
self-condence that men is a long lasting question (Lenney, 1977), which is sustained
by studies in social psychology (Furnham, 2001, Haynes and Heilman, 2013, Bleidorn
et al., 2016) showing females as less likely to perceive themselves as qualied to run for
political oce (Lawless and Fox, 2005), or expressing lower career-entry and career-peak
pay expectations (Bylsma and Major, 1992, Schweitzer et al., 2014). In particular, when
considering the job market, Barbulescu and Bidwell. (2012) showed that, among MBA
3For a more general discussion of the contributions of laboratory and eld experiments in explaining
gender dierences on labor market outcomes see Azmat and Petrongolo (2014).
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students, women's lower expectations of job demand's success is one of the causes of
their lower number of applications to nance and consulting jobs with respect to men.
Even if such expectations had not had an empirical foundation (i.e. the authors found no
evidence that women were less likely to receive job oers in any of these elds), they lead
women to accept lower salary oers than the ones accepted by their male counterparts
(Bowles et al., 2005). In line with these results, in a recent experiment Mobius et al.
(2014) found that women are signicantly more conservative than men in updating their
beliefs about their own ability. One implication is that high-ability women who receive
the same mix of signals as high-ability men will tend to end up less condent4.
Our main contribution is to provide a rst theoretical foundation to explain the
crucial role of self-condence in explaining the observed gender gap in the workplace, as
put into evidence by previous experimental results (Kamas and Preston, 2012a, Buser
et al., 2014). If women and men are dierent in how they perceive themselves as having
the abilities to full the job responsibilities with respect to other candidates, this will
aect in turn their job application decision, with women being less likely to apply to the
skilled segment of the market. Gender segregation occurs due to a dierent psycological
attitude among men and women. Women, more frequently than men, self-select into
lower ranked job positions due to their (mis)perceptions about their opportunity to be
successfully recruited. The unequal distribution of males and females between the skilled
and unskilled sector is thus endogenous on workers' application choices.
In our model we consider a stylized labor market segmented in two levels, represented
by two rms: rm G oers a small number of high-skilled jobs while rm B oers a large
number of low-skilled jobs. Each worker receives a (not fully) informative binary signal
of her own ability, which can be high (H) or low (L), and can apply at most to one
rm: a worker who applies to rm B is hired for sure while, if she applies to rm G,
she is hired only if receiving an oer. Firm G, when hiring, gives priority to high ability
workers when being able to screen candidates' ability with some positive probability
p. Dierently, with complementary probability 1   p rm G hires workers at random
among the pool of candidates, being unable to rank them according to their abilities.
Workers face a trade-o between getting a sure but low paying job in rm B and a risky
application to rm G for a high salary. We assume that salaries are xed and such that
4A book targeted to the general public and discussing women undercondence was published by
Kay & Shipman in 2014, The Condence Code: The Science and Art of Self-Assurance|What Women
Should Know.
3
if p = 0 all workers apply to G.
Without any behavioral bias, results are very intuitive. When p is small all workers
apply to G; when it increases workers who received signal L apply with probability
lower than one, while workers who received signal H apply with probability one and,
nally, when p is larger than a certain threshold p only workers who received signal H
apply to rm G. It is easy to see that the larger is p the higher is the average quality of
workers hired by rm G, because of two reasons: rst, rm G increases the probability
to hire the right candidates and, second, the average quality of the pool of candidates
increases too. As a consequence, rm G hires, on average, better workers also when it is
not able to screen them. However, an increase in the ability of screening candidates may
have a negative eect on the average quality of the pool of applicants to rm G, when
there exist undercondent individuals who assign themselves a high probability of being
low ability workers even if having received signal H. In presence of undercondence,
for intermediate values of p all workers except those who are undercondent and have
received signal L apply to rm G. When p increases only selfcondent workers apply,
independently on the signal received. Undercondence may lead to an inecient job
matching equilibrium because rms are no longer selecting their workers from a pool
containing the best tted ones.
Positive interventions to push talented but undercondent workers to apply for highly
skilled positions cannot easily be implemented, simply because undercondence is not
an observable characteristic and any attempt to elicit this information from workers
can be easily manipulated. Nonetheless, when an observable characteristic, such as
gender, is positively correlated with the unobservable one, a second best policy based on
gender armative action may enhance the eciency of matching in the job market. Our
second contribution is to show that, in the presence of a positive correlation between
undercondence and gender, an armative action imposing a gender quota on the labour
force composition may not only increase the job market diversity, but also increases
market eciency.
1.1 Literature Review
A number of studies in psychology and economics have analyzed the role of self-condence
both from a practical and theoretical point of view. In particular, when considering the
role played by self-condence in the labor market, most of the literature has been pri-
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marily focused on the agency model. In Sautmann (2013) and Santos Pinto (2008, 2010)
studies, the principal, who is aware of the agent's overcondence5, takes advantage of
it by paying the worker a lower wage. Benabou and Tyrole (2002) analyze the role
of self-condence in inuencing how people process information and make decisions in
order to explain some \irrational" behaviors such as self-handicapping or self-deception.
In the studies by Falk et al. (2006a,b) and Andolfatto et al. (2009) self-condence is
analyzed in a job searching framework. While Andolfatto et al. (2009) apply the ideas
of Benabou and Tyrole (2002) in a model of labor market search, Falk et al. (2006a,b)
show that wrong beliefs about relative ability aects unemployment duration, in turn
determining worker's potential starting wages.
Our results are consistent with the recent study by Flory et al. (2015). They show, in
a natural eld experiment where almost 9000 job-seekers are randomized into dierent
compensation regimes, that women are less likely than men to apply to competitive
work settings as much as they shy away from jobs characterized by uncertainty over the
payment, where is the worker`s ability that inuence the labour outcome. Thus, even if
the worker is not performing against anyone else, so that competition does not play any
role, females are less condent than men about their ability to successfully full the job
request.
When considering sorting decisions in the labor market and in educational attain-
ments, Filippin and Paccagnella (2012) provide evidence that the level of condence of
young agents may consistently aect their future lives: they show that even small dier-
ences in initial condence of people about their ability may lead to diverging patterns
of human capital accumulation between otherwise identical individuals. Larkin and
Leider (2012) and Dohmen and Falk (2011) experimentally demonstrate that dierent
incentive schemes invite dierent employees to join the organization, depending on their
behavioral biases. In a study closely relate to our topic, Santos Pinto (2012) analyze the
emergence of the gender pay gap as a result of males and females dierent levels of self-
condence in the classic labor market signaling model by Spence (1973): overcondent
men are more likely to invest in education than undercondent women, which in turn
lead to a higher productivity of men with respect to women, thus generating a gender
pay gap.
Dierently than in our study, Santos Pinto (2012) aims to explain the gender gap
5Santos Pinto (2008) refers to the term positive (negative) self-image as the agent's over(under)
estimation of the productivity of eort.
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in wages while we focus our attention at the previous level: we want to investigate the
gender gap in the job application process which results in gender segregation, due to high
qualied but undercondent women renoucing to apply to the high skilled job market.
Moreover, the author explains the existance of a gender pay gap according to dierent
(observable) educational investements made by biased males and females, while in our
model the role of the bias does aect their career choice, when holding the same level of
ability and education. This job mismatching causes an eciency loss in the job market,
which can be canceled out by calibrating a suitable armative action that guarantees
the participation of high skilled women in the job market.
Previous researchers have analyzed models of directed search where workers do not
randomly search among all possible jobs, but apply for jobs that are more likely to
be appropriate for their skills and interests. In particular, Galenianos and Kircher
(2009) develop a model where both the success probability of unemployed workers and
the wages posted by rms are equilibrium outcomes. Wage dispersion is the result of
allowing every worker to apply for multiple jobs. Dierently that in their paper, in our
model we allow for heteregoneity of both workers and rms, rather than assuming that
all workers and all rms are identical. Moreover, as in Chade et al. (2006) and Nagypal
(2004) the wages are exogenously given but, a fundamental modication of our paper is
played by the role of biased beliefs of (female) workers regarding their relative abilities.
During the past years, several policies have been proposed to establish gender (and
minorities) equality in the job market (see Anderson (2004), for an historical view of
the armative action agenda). Armative action, rst instituted in US in the 1960s
and 1970s by employers and educational institutions, is a policy designed to increase
the employment and educational opportunities available for disadvantage groups. Of-
ten, it is adressed to qualied women and other minorities and gives them preference
in hiring, promotion, and admission. Coate and Loury (1993) provide mixed results
regarding whether positive discrimination policies eliminate negative stereotypes in the
employer's beliefs. Armative action such as exogenous imposed quotas on the labour
force composition have been often criticized for being unfair and inecient. Opponents
to such a policy, claim that it is unfair to hire an individual for a job on anything other
than his qualications and skills.
In a recent laboratory experiment, Balafoutas and Sutter (2012) provide evidence
that armative actions encourage women to enter competition more often, without
negatively aecting eciency. Niederle et al. (2013) obtained a similar result when
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experimentally testing the eect of quotas in favor of women in competitive tournaments.
Moreover, in contrast with a common critique to the implementation of quotas, they
did not nd a decrease in the minimum performance threshold when achieving a more
diverse set of winners. Finally, in a recent eld experiment investigating armative
actions in Colombia (Ibaezy et al., 2015), the authors nd that the gains of attracting
female applicants far outweigh the losses in male applicants. In the present study we
thus provide a theoretical foundation of the positive eect of quotas in favor of women
in the labor market. However, we are not claiming that positive discrimination policies,
such as gender quotas, are the only solution to the gender segregation problem. Our
model suggests that the gender gap may be a result of a structural bias in the society
(Gneezy and Leonard, 2009), so that an eective desegregation policy should intervene
early in life in order to provide educational programmes designed to positively encourage
the correct development of self-image in both men and women and to promote new role
models.
In the following section, we compute the equilibrium of the model when workers have
unbiased beliefs about their abilities and when female workers exhibit undercondence.
In Section 3 we analyze the role of armative actions. Finally, Section 4 discusses the
results and conclusions. Proofs of all results are in the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a job market with the following matching process. There is a mass equal to
one of workers, balanced in terms of gender. Workers may either decide to apply for
a job oered by rm G or by rm B. Firm B has a number of vacancies equal to one
and, therefore, all workers who apply for this job are hired. Firm G only oers z < 1
posts. Wages are xed and equal to wG and wB; for rm G and B respectively, with
wG > wB > 0:
Each worker is of type (ability) k = H, with k 2 fH;Lg, with probability ﬀ and of
type k = L with complementary probability 1  ﬀ. Each worker receives an informative
signal si 2 fH;Lg about her/his type. The signals are independent from each other
and informative: for both k 2 fH;Lg let Pr(i = kjsi = k) = 
k denote the probability
that worker i is of type k conditioned on having received signal si = k: We assume
that H > 12 and 
L > 12 : Both the quality of the signals and the proportion of H and
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L types in the job market is common knowledge so we dene  as the proportion of
candidates who received the signal si = H and 1    as the proportion of candidates
who received the signal si = L. After having observed the signal, each worker decides
whether to apply to rm G or B of the labor market. Each worker can apply at most
to one rm.6 The utility of an employed worker is equal to her wage while the payos
of unmatched workers are normalized to zero. Since there is no unemployment benet,
participation constraints are satised.
Firm G gives priority to H workers when hiring. With probability p rm G observes
the applicants' type, while with complementary probability rm G is not able to observe
their type. If more than z workers apply to G then a rationing occurs. When rm G
is able to observe the applicants` type, it hires H workers rst and, if some jobs are
still vacant, workers of type L are enrolled too.7 Dierently, when applicants' type is
not observed by rm G; it randomly selects z workers among their applicants. Workers,
hence, decide whether to compete for a job position in rm G, which provides a higher
payo conditional on success, or to apply to rm B, that oers a sure job but for a low
pay.
Along the rest of the paper we assume the following:
Assumptions A1: H  z and zwG > wB.
The assumption that H  z implies that at least z workers who are H-type receive
the signal si = H: Consequently, if rm G perfectly observes the candidates` type, so
that p = 1, and all workers who receive a signal si = H apply to rm G; then L type
workers are not hired in rm G. According to our second assumption, if rm G is unable
to observe candidates' type and hire at random, so that p = 0; then all workers apply
to rm G.
In our model, search is directed, rms publicly post vacancies and commit to a wage
and each worker chooses to which job to apply for. We assume that agents can only apply
to one rm, not to both. This is a reasonable assumption since job applications is a time
consuming process: workers need to adjust their resume in order to present themselves
as the ones perfectly tting the job, according to the rm's specic requirements. As
6Alternatively, we could assume that the worker has to pay a specic cost Ck with CG > 0 and CB
normalized to zero (investment in education, for instance) to apply to sector k . Results are similar in
a model with sunk costs.
7In our model, we assume that employers do not have prior beliefs regarding gender ability, i.e.
negative stereotypes. In particular, rms select workers only considering the applicants' abilities.
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a consequence, candidates do not apply to all the job oers in the market, but just
select the ones that they think to be the more achievable from their own point of
view. Finally, to dene whether a position is achievable or not a candidate has to
take into consideration many factors: the expected salary, the working environment,
but also his (perceived) relative ability with respect to others potential competitors in
the application process. Our model resembles the academic market: universities are
vertically dierentiated (in our model the market is segmented in two levels), entry
salaries are xed at large extent and there are a limited number of jobs available; as in
our model, candidates may apply to a limited number of jobs (due to time and eort
constraints).8
2.1 The job matching equilibrium
We rst derive the job matching equilibria in the benchmark case in which workers do
not have biased beliefs regarding their ability. In both subsections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, we
examine the job matching equilibria when considering dierent levels of rm G`s ability
to screen its applicants' types.
2.1.1 The benchmark case
In this section we examine the matching equilibria that will be used as a benchmark
when we introduce the assumption that some workers have biased beliefs about their
own ability.
Proposition 1. If p  p, with p  
H(zwG wB)
zwG(H+L 1)
and zwG  wB
H
1 L
, then in equilib-
rium workers who receive a signal si = H apply to rm G and those who receive a signal
si = L apply to rm B (separating equilibrium). If p 
(zwG wB)[H+(1 L)(1 )]
zwG(H+L 1)
 ~p,
both types of workers apply to rm G (pooling equilibrium). If p 2 [~p; p]; there is a
semiseparating equilibrium such that workers who receive a signal si = H apply to rm
G and those who receive a signal si = L are indierent: a fraction (p) 2 (0;
1
2) of
them apply to rm B and a fraction (1  (p)) apply to rm G; with (p) satisfying the
following equality (p[(1  L) z
(1 L)(1 )+H
] + (1  p) z
+(1 )wG = wB:
Corollary 1. An increase in p increases the average quality of the pool of applicants.
8In the American job market each candidate can send a limited number of expressions of interests to
the departments they applied (currently only ve), which are considered as credible signal of a sincere
interest in the position.
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Proof of proposition 1 is in the Appendix. Previous proposition states that, when
rm G`s ability to screen candidates is high enough (p  p), only workers receiving a
signal si = H apply to G and, among them, 
H are truly H types and (1  H) are
L types who received the wrong signal. Since we assume that z  H , the probability
to hire a high ability worker is equal to p+(1  p)H . When the probability p to screen
candidates decreases, the eciency of the matching decreases as well. Namely, if p < ~p;
the probability of hiring a H worker is p + (1 p)2 : Thus, since 
H  12 , an increased
ability of hiring based on merit by rm G induces a more ecient matching in the job
market.
2.1.2 Undercondence and job matching
In this section we introduce the following modication with respect to the benchmark
case: a fraction of workers  has now biased beliefs regarding their ability in the job
market. In particular, when an undercondent worker receives a signal si = H, (s)he
underestimates the quality of the signal and believes that (s)he is of type L with a larger
probability: parameter  measures the worker's bias, that we dene as undercondence,
with 0    +1.
Formally, an undercondent individual i who observes si = H at time t = 0 assigns
probability Pr(i = H j si = H) =
1
1+
H to be a H-type worker. Therefore, Pr(i =
L j si = H) =
1+ H
1+ is the probability that an undercondent worker i assigns to be
a L type worker when she receives a signal si = H. Similary, Pr(i = L j si = L) =
min(1; 1+1 
L): 9
Assumption A2:  > 
H
1 L
  1:
We focus on the more interesting case for our analysis, that is when undercondence
is suciently severe so that 11+
H < 1  L: an undercondent individual who gets a
signal si = H assigns a lower probability to be a H-type with respect to the probability
that an unbiased individual who observes si = L assigns to his own type. Now workers
dier not only with respect to the signal they receive of their ability, but also with respect
to their level of self-condence (which, as we put into evidence in the introduction, might
be correlated with their gender). We have thus to analyse the decision of four dierent
9Think, for example, of a student who receives a good mark on an exam (i.e. a signal about her/his
ability): s/he may think it was not due to her/his ability but the result of a mistake of the professor, or
that it depends on luck; s/he does not correctly infer the information of the signal, because of her/his
prior beliefs about her/his own ability.
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types of workers: self and undercondent workers who received signal H, and those who
received signal L.
We focus on the case p  p such that in equilibrium without biased condence,
only workers who receive the signal si = H apply to rm G: When the fraction  of
undercondent workers in the population is suciently high, we observe the following
equilibria depending on how p varies:
 if p is suciently high and there are "enough" selfcondent workers with si = H;
then only these workers (who received si = H and are selfcondent) apply to G
and all the other workers apply to B:
 if p is smaller and included in a certain interval, then selfcondent workers with
si = H will still apply with probability one, while undercondent workers (irre-
spectively of their signal) do not apply. Selfcondent workers who got si = L now
apply with positive probability.
Previous intuitions are formalized in the following proposition. Sorting is dened as
inecient when (some) workers who have received signal si = H apply to rm B and
(some) workers who received a signal s = L apply to rm G: We will rst derive the
equilibria when considering a low proportion of undercondent workers in the population
and, secondly, when such a fraction is higher than a certain threshold.
Proposition 2. If z  H(1  ) and p  [zwG wB(1 )]
H
zwG(H+L 1)
, only selfcondent work-
ers who observe si = H apply to rm G. If z  [
H + (1   L)(1   )](1   ), p 2
[zwG wB(1 )][(1+)(
H+(1 L(1 ))]
zwGf[H+(1 L)(1 )](1+) Hg
; [zwG wB(1 )][
H+(1 L)(1 )]
zwG(H+L 1)

and  > zwG
wB
  1
all selfcondent workers, irrespective of their signal, apply to rm G while all un-
dercondent workers, irrespective of their signal, apply to rm B. If z  H +
(1  ) (1  ) (1   L) and p 
(1+)[zwG wB(+(1 )(1 ))][H+(1 )(1 L)(1 )]
zwGf(1+)[H+(1 )(1 L)(1 )] H [+(1 )(1 )]g
, al-
l selfcondent workers and undercondent workers who receive si = H apply to r-
m G, while undercondent workers who receive signal si = L apply to rm B. If
z  H + (1   L)(1   ) and p  (zwG wB)[
H+(1 )(1 L)]
zwG[H+(H+L 1)]
, then all workers apply
to rm G.
Corollary 2. When z  [H + (1   L)(1   )](1   ) there exist two thresholds p0
and p00 with p00 > p0 such that the average quality of the pool of applicants when p < p0
is higher than in case p 2 [p0; p00].
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We observe a similar characterization of equilibria when considering a higher pro-
portion of undercondent workers in the population.
If H(1   )  z  (1   ) and p  [zwG wB(1 )](1 
H)
wG(H+L 1)[(1 ) z]
, only selfcondent candi-
dates who observe si = H apply to rm G. If  [
H+(1 L)(1 )](1 )  1 , p 2
[zwG wB(1 )][(1 
H)+L(1 )](1+)
wGf(1+)[(1 )[H+(1 )(1 L)]+z[(1 H)+L(1 ) 1]] H(1 z )g
;
[zwG wB(1 )][(1 
H)+L(1 )]
wG(1 z )(H+ L 1)

and   z[
H+1 ((1 H)+L(1 ))]+(L+H 1)(1 )(1 )
(1 )[H+(1 )(1 L)]+z[(1 H)+L(1 ) 1]
, only selfcondent candidates
apply to rm G. If z  H + (1   )(1   L) and p  (zwG wB)[(1 
H)+(1 )L]
wG(1 z)[L+(H+L 1)]
, all
workers apply to rm G.
According to the previous proposition, when p decreases and the fraction of under-
condent workers is suciently large, we move from an equilibrium where only selfcon-
dent workers who received a signal si = H apply to rm G to an equilibrium where also
selfcondent workers who observed si = L apply to rm G, while undercondent work-
ers with si = H are still enrolled in rm B. Dierently, an equilibrium where workers
who observe si = H apply to rm G, irrespective of their level of self-condence,, while
other workers apply to rm B (no gender segregation and ecient sorting) cannot exist
because of our assumption A2.10
When the fraction of undercondent workers is suciently large we observe a nega-
tive consequence on matching: if  = 0 an increase in p increases the probability of an
ecient matching (i.e. workers who receive a signal si = H apply to rm G while those
who receive a signal si = L apply to rm G ). If  > 0 an increase in p may have a detri-
mental eect because it increases the probability to exclude the undercondent workers
who received a signal si = H. Previous evidence (Barbulescu and Bidwell., 2012, Kamas
and Preston, 2012b, Buser et al., 2014) supports the hypothesis that undercondence is
correlated with gender; as a consequence, we observe a gender gap in the labor market,
even in absence of any discrimination or negative stereotype against women.
2.1.2.1 A test for the emergence of the gender gap Our model allows to test
whether the emergence of inecient sorting and, consequently, of a gender gap, depends
on gender dierences in self-condence or in other characteristics, like aversion to compe-
tition or risk aversion. In our model if p 
(1+)[zwG wB(+(1 )(1 ))][H+(1 )(1 L)(1 )]
zwGf(1+)[H+(1 )(1 L)(1 )] H [+(1 )(1 )]g
10Proof of Proposition 2 and of the following non-existence of additional equilibria is provided in the
Appendix.
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, all workers who received a signal si = H and selfcondent candidates who received
signal si = L apply to rm G. When p increases and is included in the interval
p 2
n
[zwG wB(1 )][(1+)(
H+(1 L(1 ))]
zwGf[H+(1 L)(1 )](1+) Hg
; [zwG wB(1 )][
H+(1 L)(1 )]
zwG(H+L 1)
o
, however, the
number of workers who got si = H and decides to apply to G decreases, because un-
dercondent workers do not apply anymore. This prediction cannot occur if female and
male workers dier in their aversion to risk or competition. In particular:
1. Aversion to competition: since rm B is characterized by a non competitive en-
vironment, competition averse workers should prefer to apply to it even when
receiving a signal si = H, because they assign a non monetary benet in working
in a non competitive environment. However, since in our model the expected ben-
et of applying to rm G for a worker who received a signal si = H is increasing
in p then, in presence of competition aversion, the number of workers with si = H
who applies in G should increase and not decrease when p increases.
2. Risk-aversion: Consider rst a low value of p: When p = 0, every worker applies
to rm G so that the probability of being hired is z: On the contrary, when p = 1,
conditional on having received si = H, the probability of being hired is higher.
As a consequence, when increasing p, the risk of competing for a job in rm G
decreases. In our model, irrespective of workers` risk attitude, we therefore should
observe an increasing number of candidates receiving a signal si = H applying to
G; as the level of p increases (and there are not any biases in self-condence).
It follows that if an increase in rm G`s ability to screen their candidates is associated
with a decrease in the number of workers receiving a signal si = H applying to G, then
only the presence of undercondence can rationalize this evidence. Policies aim to reduce
undercondence might be hard to design (undercondence has been showed to be related
to educational models, cultural bias, etc). However, if undercondence is correlated with
an observable characteristic such as gender, armative actions may represent a second
best policy to increase market eciency.
3 Armative Action
In our model rms' ability to screen workers is not sucient to restore an ecient
matching, because undercondence prevents some good workers to apply for the skilled
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segment of the market and therefore there is an inecient candidates' self-selection. As
a consequence, a job market in which rm G is perfectly able to identify who are the
best candidates, may be less ecient and induce more segregation than a market in
which rm G has a lower screening ability.
In this section we want to study which policies rm G can implement to increase the
quality of its hirings in presence of undercondence of some of the (good) candidates.
An armative action is usually designed to improve the employment or educational
opportunities of individuals in disadvantaged group. These policies sought to eliminate
the injustices so frequently associated with discrimination, but there is disagreement
about how to design them, and the introduction of exogenous quotas are particularly
ostracised. Nevertheless, in our study we are presenting a theoretical explanation in fa-
vor of the introduction of a gender quota. If ability is equally distributed among males
and females workers, but women are more undercondent on average, introducing an ex-
ogenously imposed quota would lead qualied but undercondent women to apply, thus
increasing the diversity and eciency of the labor force, without discriminating men.
Recent studies have indeed supported the introduction of armative actions to increase
women's willingness to compete (Villeval, 2012). Laboratory (Balafoutas and Sutter,
2012, Niederle et al., 2013) and eld (Ibaezy et al., 2015) experiments demonstrated
that gender quotas do not result in less able women overtaking most able men. In the
present study, besides providing a theoretical evidence which explains the emergence of
gender segregation in the job market as a result of women's undercondence, we now
demonstrate the ecacy of a calibrated quota in closing the gender gap and restoring
eciency.
Suppose that undercondence and gender are correlated. In this case we aim to show
that a quota policy might not only increase the average quality of the pool of applicants
but also the average quality of workers hired by rm G. Note that we do not provide an
argument to support a quota policy based on equitable considerations, but we want to
show that a quota policy can increase not only the pool of candidates applying to rm G,
but also the quality of the hired workers. To make the argument as simple as possible,
we consider the (extreme) case where all male workers are selfcondent while all female
workers are undercondent. The reasoning we provide can be easily generalized to the
case in which the fraction of undercondent workers is larger among female than male
candidates.
Let`s assume that 12 > ﬀ > z >
ﬀ
2 ; where ﬀ is the number of H   type workers in
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the pool of candidates; notice that we have assumed that the number of male H   type
workers is lower than z; but the number of H   type workers is larger than z: Assume
also for sake of simplicity that p = 1 and H = 1; so that, if no worker is undercondent
rm G only hires H workers.
Consider the equilibrium where all men workers apply to G while no female workers
apply. This situation occurs only if undercondent (female) workers are suciently
pessimistic, that is 11+ < 1  
L;and the following conditions hold:

1  L + L
2z   ﬀ
1  ﬀ

wG  wB;
and 
1
1 + 
+

1 + 
2z   ﬀ
1  ﬀ

wG < wB;
Since by assumption z > ﬀ2 , rm G is forced to assume L   type workers simply
because there are not enoughH type workers applying. It is straightforward to conclude
that if this situation occurs, it is protable for rm G to push female workers to apply.
We show that a policy in which rm G commits to hire (at least) z   ﬀ2 female workers
increases the average quality of its workers. It is important to notice that which equilibria
arise when a gender quota is xed, will depend on workers' beliefs about the distribution
of undercondence among other workers. We consider undercondence as a psycological
trait of rational agents who only underestimate their own ability, but have correct beliefs
about what occurs in equilibrium. Namely, undercondent workers know the correct
distribution of ability not only in the pool of candidates, but also in the set of workers
hired by rm G. We also restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria in which workers
with the same ability and level of condence play the same strategy.
Proposition 3. Suppose that rm G, with p = 1, only hires male workers because
female workers are undercondent and do not apply to it. Then, there exists a quota
policy that strictly increases the average quality of workers hired by rm G.
Notice that even a small quota can push female workers to apply to rm G, thus
destroying the possibility of an equilibrium in which less than z workers of high ability
apply to rm G: Any policy that provides incentives to H female workers to apply
without undermining male workers' incentives is clearly benecial for rm G: However,
nding the optimal policy for rm G is not a trivial task because multiple equilibria
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arise. Moreover, equitable considerations should also play a role in determining which
policy is desirable for the society.
4 Discussion
In this paper we have built a stylized model which present the positive correlation
between gender and undercondence as an explanation of gender segregation in the
job market. Our results are consistent with recent experimental evidence showing that
females are more likely to be undercondent with respect to their abilities (Kamas and
Preston, 2012a,b, Flory et al., 2015).
Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that talented female workers, when being
undercondent, do not apply to the skilled segment of the market, and this result is
exacerbated when the ability of the employers to screen their candidates is high. This
generates an inecient sorting because less talented, but selfcondent workers may be
induced to apply to high-skilled jobs, due to the reduction in competition they face. Our
results depend on the particular behavioural bias assumed since workers characterized
by competition or risk aversion will behave as in our benchmark model. We show that
the workers` undercondence has an eect on the pool of candidates applying to rms.
As a consequence, employers should not only focus on the procedures used to select the
best workers, but also on how to attract the best pool of candidates: a selection based
on merit from the wrong pool can be worse than a biased selection from a better pool.
Second, in our model armative actions may restore the eciency of the job matching.
When in presence of a correlation between undercondence and gender, a gender quota
allows rms to enhance the quality of the pool of applicants, without negatively aecting
the selection process. We show that incentivizing women to participate in the high
skilled segment of the job market is not (only) a question of fairness. However, more
eective solutions may be implemented to recover the ecient matching between rms
and workers in the long term. In particular, the gender gap in self-condence seems to
develop early in life (Orenstein, 1994, Homan, 1972) and depending on factors such
as socioeconomic environments and parental attitudes (Filippin and Paccagnella, 2012,
Chowdry et al., 2011). A policy which intervenes to equally encourage the development
of self-image in young women and men would be benecial in improving the gender
equality and the eciency of the job market. It has indeed recently been showed that
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educational and role model interventions in children can mitigate the gender gap, mainly
acting through self-condence and the response to performance feedback (Alan and
Ertac, 2016).
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
First of all we prove the existence of the equilibrium such that only workers who
receive a signal si = H apply to rms in rm G if p  p: A worker who receives a signal
si = H has not incentive to deviate if and only if:
p

H

z
H

+
 
1  H

max

0;
z   H
 (1  H)

+ (1  p)
z

ﬀ
wG  wB (1)
with probability p rm G is able to observe the applicants' type. Since with probability
Pr(i = Hjsi = H) = 
H the signal is correct, the worker will be enrolled in G depending
on the size of the segment z and on the proportion of true H types applicants. In
particular, the probability of a (true) H type worker getting a job in G is equal to z
H
.
With probability Pr(i = Ljsi = H) = 1 
H the worker receiving a signal si = H is a L
type applicant and thus, if z is small enough, she will be not enrolled and will get zero
utility. However, if there are still vacant jobs in G after that all true H types applicants
are hired, that is z  H , she will get a job competing with other L type applicants

 
1  H

. Finally, with probability 1  p, rm G is not able to observe the applicants'
type and thus will select workers at random. In such a situation, all applicants will be
hired with probability z

.
By assumption z < H so that segment G is smaller than the proportion of true
H type workers receiving a signal si = H. Therefore, equation 1 can be written as:
2zwG  wB (2)
which holds by Assumption A1.
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Workers who receive a signal si = L have not incentive to deviate from the above
equilibrium if and only if:
p

L

max

0;
z   H
 (1  H)

+ (1  L)
z
H

+ (1  p)
z

ﬀ
wG  wB (3)
that is with probability L the signal is correct and the worker is a true L type so
when deviating and applying to a position in rm G, with probability p she will be
enrolled only if there is a sucient number of vacancies with probability z 
H
(1 H)
. With
probability 1   L the signal si = L is not correct and thus the worker will compete
with with others H type workers for a job in G and will be enrolled with probability
z
H
. Finally, with complementary probability 1   p, rm G is not able to observe the
applicants' type and thus will select workers at random.
By assumption zwG  wB and 
H + L > 1, thus deviating from equilibrium is not
protable when:
p 
H (zwG   wB)
zwG(H + L   1)
= p (4)
Consider now a strategy prole such that all workers apply to rm G.
Workers who observed si = H apply to G if and only if:
p

H

min
 z
ﬀ
; 1

+ (1  H)

max

0;
z   ﬀ
1  ﬀ

+ (1  p)z
ﬀ
wG  wB (5)
with ﬀ = H + (1  H)(1  ). With probability p rm G observe applicants` ability.
If z is suciently large the candidate is getting a job for sure. In the alternative case,
the probability to be hired depends on the size of the segment z and on the proportion
of H workers who applies to rm G, that is z
H+(1 H)(1 )
. Since z < H , when
being a true L type, a worker is not hired by rm G. By rearranging equation 5 it
follows that:
p 
(wB   zwG)[
H + (1  L)(1  )]
zwG (H + L   1) (1  )
(6)
which always holds since the numerator of equation 6 is negative by assumption A1
while its denominator is positive.
Workers who receive signal si = L apply to G if and only if:h
p(1  L)

min
 z
ﬀ
; 1

+ (1  p)z
i
wG  wB (7)
if the signal is correct, (s)he will not be enrolled in G when it is able to screen candidates:
High ability types will be hired and no more vacant jobs will be available since, by
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assumption A1, z  H . With probability (1  L) the worker is a truly H type, thus
(s)he will get a position in G competing with other H type candidates. By rearranging
equation 7 we get:
p 
(zwG   wB)[
H + (1  L)(1  )]
zwG (H + L   1)
= ~p (8)
Finally, let  2 (0; 12) be the fraction of workers who observe si = L and apply to
rm B: These workers are indierent whether to apply to rm G or B if and only if:
p[(1  L)
z
(1  L)(1  ) + H
] + (1  p)
z
 + (1  )
ﬀ
wG = wB; (9)
equality 9 can be written as p = (zwG wB)[(1 
L)(1 )+H ]
zG(H+L 1)(1 )
and this expression is
decreasing in ; therefore this equilibrium exists if p 2

(zwG wB)[
H+(1 L)(1 )]
zwG(H+L 1)(1 )
;
(wB zwG)[
H+(1 L)(1 )]
zwG(H+L 1)(1 )

:
A strategy prole such that no worker applies to rm G cannot exist, because any
worker could deviate and successfully apply to rm G:
Proof of Proposition 2
(i)Inecient Sorting (and gender segregation) Consider rst an equilibrium where
all selfcondent workers, independently on whether they received a signal si = L or
si = H apply to rm G and all undercondent workers apply to rm B:
Selfcondent workers who receive a signal si = H will apply to G if the following
condition is satised:

p

H

min

1; z
[H+(1 L)(1 )](1 )

+
 
1  H

max

0;
z [H+(1 L)(1 )](1 )
[(1 H)+L(1 )](1 )

+ (1  p) z1 
ﬀ
wG  wB (10)
depending on the fraction of selfcondent candidates in the population, we may en-
counter two possible situations. If the proportion of truly H-type selfcondent candi-
dates is lower than the positions available in rm G, that is if z  [H + (1  L)(1 
)](1   ), they will be enrolled with probability one. In the opposite situation, they
will compete with other selfcondent H   type workers for a position. In the latter case
previous equation is equal to:
p 
[wB(1  )  zwG][
H + (1  L)(1  )]
zwG (H + L   1) (1  )
(11)
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while in the rst case it is equal to:
p 
[wB(1  )  zwG][(1  
H) + H(1  )]
wG fz[1  [(1  H) + L(1  )]] + (H + L   1)(1  )(1  )g
(12)
Both conditions 11 and 12 are always satised since, by assumption A.1, the numer-
ator is negative and the denominator is positive.
Undercondent workers who observe si = H prefer not to apply to G when all
selfcondent workers apply if:

p

H
1+

min

1; z
[H+(1 L)(1 )](1 )

+ 1+ 
H
1+

max

0;
z [H+(1 L)(1 )](1 )
[(1 H)+L(1 )](1 )

+ (1  p) z1 
ﬀ
wG  wB (13)
while selfcondent workers receiving si = L apply to rm G only if

p

(1  L)

min

1; z
[H+(1 L)(1 )](1 )

+ L

max

0;
z [H+(1 L)(1 )](1 )
[(1 H)+L(1 )](1 )

+ (1  p) z1 

wG  wB (14)
when z  [H + (1   L)(1   )](1   ) previous equations are satised if  > zwG
wB
 
1 and  > (1 )(
H+L 1)
(1 )(1+L)+H
, which is always true because of assumption A.2. As a
consequence, this equilibriums exists when p 2

[zwG wB(1 )][(1+)(
H+(1 L)(1 ))]
zwG[H+(1 L)(1 )](1+) H ]
;
[zwG wB(1 )][(
H+(1 L)(1 )]
zwG(H+L 1)

: the larger is  the larger is the set of parameter values
for which this equilibrium exists.
Note that when z  wB(1 )(
H+(1 L)(1 ))
wG(1 L)
, with wG 
wB
1 L
, equation 14 is
satised irrespective of p so that only the constraint on equation 13 becomes bind-
ing: this equilibrium exists when p  [zwG wB(1 )][(1+)(
H+(1 L)(1 ))]
zwG[H+(1 L)(1 )](1+) H ]
and  >
(1 )(H+L 1)
(1 )(1+L)+H
.
Let`s now analyse the case when z  [H + (1   L)(1   )](1   ). If z  1   
then equation 14 is satised irrespective of p. However, in order for equation 13 to be
satised, it must be that z  [
H+(1 L)(1 )](1 )
1 [(1 H)+L(1 )]
 1   . Therefore, this equilib-
rium exists when p 2

[zwG wB(1 )][(1 
H)+L(1 )](1+)
wGf(1+)[(1 )[H+(1 )(1 L)]+z[(1 H)+L(1 ) 1]] H(1 z )g
;
[zwG wB(1 )][(1 
H)+L(1 )]
wG(1 z )(H+ L 1)

with  > zwG
wB
  1; and undercondence is suciently
severe   z[
H+1 ((1 H)+L(1 ))]+(L+H 1)(1 )(1 )
(1 )[H+(1 )(1 L)]+z[(1 H)+L(1 ) 1]
.
(ii) Ecient Sorting (and Gender Segregation):Consider now an equilibrium where,
among the selfcondent workers, only those who received a signal si = H apply to rm
G, while all undercondent workers apply to rm B:
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Undercondent workers who received a signal si = H prefer to not apply to rm G
if:

p
h
H
1+

min

1; z
H(1 )

+

1+ H
1+

max

0; z 
H(1 )
(1 H)(1 )
i
+ (1  p)
z
(1  )
ﬀ
wG  wB (15)
when the market is able to screen candidates, p > 0, with probability 
H
1+ they are truly
H type workers thus they are enrolled for sure if there are enough vacancies, otherwise
they will compete with High ability selfcondent candidates for a job. If we assume that
z  H(1  ) the latter case applies.
Similarly, selfcondent workers who observe si = L do not apply to rm G if:

p
 
1  L
 
min

1; z
H(1 )

+ L

max

0; z 
H(1 )
(1 H)(1 )
i
+ (1  p)
z
(1  )
ﬀ
wG  wB (16)
The characterization of this equilibrium depends on the fraction of selfcondent workers
in the population. Let`s rst analyse the case such that z  H(1   ): rearrang-
ing equations 15 and 16 we have that such equilibrium exists if   
H+L 1
1 L
, which
is always true because of assumption A.2, and p  [zwG wB(1 )]
H
zwG(H+L 1)
. Similarly, when
z  H(1  ), it must be that p  [zwG wB(1 )](1 
H)
wG(H+L 1)[(1 ) z]
, with z  (1  ). In both
cases, if p decreases, selfcondent workers who received a signal si = L are the rst who
deviate and apply to G, while undercondent candidates still apply to B.
(iii)Partial Gender segregation: All selfcondent workers, irrespective of their signals,
and undercondent workers who observe si = H apply to G if the following conditions
hold.
Selfcondent workers who observe s = L apply if:
(
p
"
L
 
max
 
0;
z  

H + (1  )
 
1  L

(1  )

 (1  H) + L (1  ) (1  )
!!
+ (1  L)

min

1;
z
H + (1  ) (1  L) (1  )
#
+ (1  p)
z
 + (1  ) (1  )
)
wG  wB (17)
that is if p 
[zwG wB(+(1 )(1 ))][H+(1 )(1 L)(1 )]
zwG(H+L 1)
when z  H + (1  ) 
1  L

(1  ). When and H + (1  )
 
1  L

(1  )   + (1  ) (1  ) previ-
ous equation is satised if p 
[zwG wB(+(1 )(1 ))][(1 H)+L(1 )(1 )]
wG(H+L 1)( z+(1 )(1 ))
Undercondent workers who obseve si = L do not apply if:
(
p
" 
1  (1 + )L
 
min

1; z
H+(1 )(1 L)(1 )

+ (1  )
 
max
 
0;
z  

H + (1  )
 
1  L

(1  )

 (1  H) + L (1  ) (1  )
!!#
+ (1  p)
z
 + (1  ) (1  )
)
wG  wB (18)
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If z  H + (1  )
 
1  L

(1  ), this condition is satised when  > 0 and p 
[zwG wB(+(1 )(1 ))][H+(1 )(1 L)(1 )]
zwG[(H+L 1)+L(+(1 )(1 ))]
:
If z  H + (1  )
 
1  L

(1  ) and z   + (1  ) (1  ) it must be that p 
[zwG wB(+(1 )(1 ))][(1 H)+L(1 )(1 )]
wGf[(H+L 1)( z+(1 )(1 ))]+L(+(1 )(1 ))(1 z)g
.
Finally, undercondent workers who received a signal si = H apply to G if:
(
p
" 
1
1+
H

min

1;
z
H + (1  ) (1  L) (1  )

+
1 +   H
1 + 
 
max
 
0;
z  

H + (1  )
 
1  L

(1  )

 (1  H) + L (1  ) (1  )
!!#
+ (1  p)
z
 + (1  ) (1  )
)
wG  wB
(19)
when z   + (1  ) (1  ), previous condition is satised irrespective of p if  
(1 )(1 )(H+L 1)
H+(1 )(1 L)(1 )
. However, by assumption A.2   
H
1 L
 1 
(1 )(1 )(H+L 1)
H+(1 )(1 L)(1 )
.
This equilibrium exists only when p 
(1+)[zwG wB(+(1 )(1 ))][H+(1 )(1 L)(1 )]
zwGf(1+)[H+(1 )(1 L)(1 )] H [+(1 )(1 )]g
.
(iv) Ecient Sorting (No Gender Segregation):Consider the equilibrium where work-
ers who observe si = H apply to G and while other workers apply to B, irrespective of
their level of condence.
Undercondent workers who observe a signal si = H prefer to apply when all workers
who have received si = H apply if:
p

H
1 + 

min

1; z
H

+

1+ H
1+

max

0; z 
H
(1 H)

+ (1  p) z

ﬀ
wG  wB (20)
that is if p  (zwG wB)(1+)
zwG
or p  (zwG wB)(1+)(1 
H)
wGH( z)
, respectively when z  H
and z  H
Selfcondent workers who observe si = L do not apply to rm G only if:n
p
h
(1  L)

min

1; z
H

+ L

max

0; z 
H
(1 H
i
+ (1  p) z

o
wG  wB (21)
that is if p  (zwG wB)
H
zwG(H+L 1)
or, when z  H , p  (zwG wB(1 
H))H
wG( z)(H+L 1)
. Notice that
(zwG wB)(1+)
zwG
>
(zwG B)
H
zwG(H+L 1)
implies 
H+L 1
1 L
> : The same reasoning applies when
z  H . Therefore this equilibrium cannot exist by Assumption A2.
(v) Pooling (No Gender Segregation): All workers apply to rm G if undercondent
workers who observe si = L apply to G;that is:

p
 
1 min (1; (1 + )L
 z
H + (1  )(1  L)
+ (1 + )L

max

0; z [
H+(1 )(1 L)]
(1 H)+L(1 )

+ (1  p)zwG  wB:
(22)
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The above condition is satised if p  (zwG wB)[
H+(1 )(1 L)]
zwG[L+(H+L 1)]
when z  H + (1 
)(1  L). In the opposite situation, it must be that p  (zwG wB)[(1 
H)+(1 )L]
wG(1 z)[L+(H+L 1)]
.
Proof of Proposition 3
If only male workers apply to G then, by assumption, at least 2z   ﬀ workers are
L   type: Consider a quota policy that reserves exactly 2z   ﬀ job openings to female
workers. First, notice that it does not exist an equilibrium in which no female worker
applies to G: Suppose, by contradiction, that no female worker applies to rm G : then
any female worker, irrespectively of her condence, can deviate, apply to G and be hired
with probability one, which is a protable strategy since wG > wB: Suppose that only
L   type female workers apply with positive probability to rm G: Then, the decision
to apply to rm G is a best response for a (female) worker who assesses that her own
probability of being H   type is 1 
L
1+ : Consider any H   type female worker: if she
deviates and apply to rm G her estimated payo, given that her beliefs of being H
type are equal to 
H
1+ >
1 L
1+ , is strictly larger than the the estimated payo of an
L   type: Then, there cannot be an equilibrium in which only L   type workers apply
to rm G. It follows that in any symmetric equilibrium H female workers apply with
larger probability than L   type female workers and therefore rm G hires H female
workers with positive probability. Finally, we need to show that the average quality of
male workers hired by rm G cannot be lower than their average quality without any
quota policy. Since p = 1; a male worker who receives a signal si = H knows that he
is hired with probability less than one only if rm G hires only H type workers. So,
in equilibrium, either rm G only hires H workers or H male workers are hired with
probability one and therefore all H male workers apply to rm G:
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